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Abstract
It has long been argued that growing inequality would lead to growing demands for redistribution, especially from less
affluent individuals who would benefit most from redistribution. Yet, in many countries we have not seen tax increases
and even when ballot initiatives allow individuals to directly vote to raise taxes on the wealthy they decline to do so. This
raises the question of how economic self-interest shapes voting on tax proposals, and what factors may weaken the links
between economic self-interest and tax policy preferences. In the U.S. context partisanship is a factor that has a major in-
fluence on attitudes about taxation. To explore how self-interest sometimes overcomes partisanship we take advantage of
competing initiatives that were simultaneously on the ballot in California in 2012. California’s Proposition 30, a successful
2012 initiative, significantly increased taxes on the wealthy. By comparing voting on Proposition 30 to voting on Proposi-
tion 38, whichwould have raised taxes on nearly everyone, we observe that when tax hikes are focused only on thewealthy
a substantial number of lower income Republicans (i.e., conservatives) defect from their party position opposing taxation.
We identify these low-income Republicans as “populists.” Lower income Republicans are also less supportive of income
tax increases on the lower and middle classes, and are more sensitive to income tax increases than sales tax increases. We
argue that economic self-interest causes heterogeneity within the parties in terms of attitudes toward tax increases.
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1. Introduction
Conflict over redistribution has long been one of the
main political fault lines in Western democracies. Polit-
ical economy models predict that as inequality grows
the public, and especially the less affluent, will clamor
for more redistribution (Meltzer & Richard, 1981). If this
prediction is accurate, we should see major increases in
redistribution in the U.S., where inequality has grown
more and is higher than in almost any other affluent
democracy. In the U.S. the top 1% of the population own
about 38% of the all privately held wealth according to
federal tax data; the New York Times (Kristof, 2014) re-
ports the richest 1% now owns more than the bottom
90% of the population (Piketty, 2014; see also Gilens,
2012; Volscho & Kelly, 2012). Surveys in the U.S. consis-
tently find that two-thirds of Americans believe that the
gap between the rich and everyone else has increased
over the last decade, and this view is shared by majori-
ties across nearly all groups in the public, including 61%
of Republicans (Pew Research Center, 2017). Not sur-
prisingly, then, consistent with political economy mod-
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els, Americans express high levels of support for increas-
ing taxes on the wealthy (Dutton, 2012; Roberts, Hite,
& Bradley, 1994; Yglesias, 2019). Yet, over the last few
decades we have also seen the public support large tax
cuts for the wealthy (Bartels, 2005) and sometimes even
when the public has the opportunity to increase taxes on
the wealthy by voting on ballot initiatives they decline to
do so (Franko, Tolbert, & Witko, 2013). Why do abstract
preferences for redistribution not always translate into
support for specific redistributive tax policies? We inves-
tigate how economic self-interest, partisanship and the
design of specific tax policies combine to shape support
for tax increasing ballot initiatives.
Why the public sometimes supports redistributive
tax increases but at other times declines to do so is
an important question that has been examined in nu-
merous studies (Alesina & Angeletos, 2005; Ballard-Rosa,
Martin, & Scheve, 2017; Boudreau & MacKenzie, 2018;
Heinemann & Hennighausen, 2015; Meltzer & Richard,
1981; Tuxhorn, D’Attoma, & Steinmo, 2019). Individuals
express support for redistribution and higher taxes on
the wealthy in the abstract, but this abstract support
can disappear in the context of tax policy debates in real
world politics (Bartels, 2005; Franko et al., 2013; Franko
& Witko, 2017). One reason is that individuals often fail
to link their economic self-interest to congruent posi-
tions in specific tax policy debates (Bartels, 2005). Some-
times this is because people do not understand how tax
policies will affect them and others (Slemrod, 2006). But,
more fundamentally, political economy models ignore
the fact that individuals often have strong ideological and
partisan attachments, which in the U.S especially are not
always closely tied to income position (Mason, 2018),
that predispose them for or against particular types of
tax increases (Franko et al., 2013). Left-leaning individu-
als (Democrats) will tend to support many types of tax
increases, while conservatives (Republicans) tend to op-
pose them. But are there conditions in which individuals
are willing to elevate their economic self-interest above
a general opposition to high taxes along the lines envi-
sioned by political economy models?
It is difficult to distinguish general opposition to tax-
ation from more self-interested opposition because in
many policy debates elites opposing taxes focus on the
very existence of any tax increase, rather than the spe-
cific incidence of whowill paymore, and tax cuts that pri-
marily benefit thewealthy usually include at least a small
tax cut for others (Bartels, 2005). By comparing attitudes
toward competing tax proposals which place burdens
on different segments of the population, we could dis-
tinguish self-interested opposition to tax increases from
more general opposition. Of course, there are seldom
competing tax increase proposals put placed on the bal-
lot for a public vote at any one time. Typically, govern-
ments develop and then unveil a single proposal and at-
tempt to enact it.
Thus, scholars have used experimental approaches
to examine how varying hypothetical tax burdens shapes
support from different individuals (Ballard-Rosa, Martin,
& Scheve, 2017; Boudreau & MacKenzie, 2018). Of
course, the drawback of experimental manipulations of
tax policy alternatives is that they are usually not exam-
ined in the context of actual political debates and cam-
paigns (but see Boudreau &MacKenzie, 2018). The same
limitation applies to surveys asking respondents for their
opinions about taxation in the abstract. Here, we take
advantage of competing tax proposals that were actu-
ally placed in front of California voters as ballot initia-
tives in 2012 to examine how the structure of tax poli-
cies affects individual support, and specifically how eco-
nomic self-interest (income) and partisanship combine
to shape attitudes about taxation. Proposition 30 would
have provided additional revenue for a number of gov-
ernment programs and been funded primarily by an in-
creased income tax on the wealthy—individuals earning
more than $250,000 a year or couples earningmore than
$500,000—along with a more general across the board
sales tax increase. In contrast, Proposition 38would have
achieved similar revenue and spending goals, but been
funded primarily by an income tax increase on virtually
all Californians, including substantial increases on the
middle class. These competing initiatives on the same
ballot in the same year allow us to distinguish between
individuals who support or oppose tax increases regard-
less of their specific structure to those who oppose or
support tax increases based on whether they are likely
to benefit.
Not surprisingly, we observe that Democrats gen-
erally support tax increases of any type at high levels,
while Republicans generally oppose raising taxes (see
Table 1). However, when tax hikes are focused mostly
on the wealthy a substantial number of lower income
Republicans defect from their party position opposing
taxation. Overall, the effect of self-interest varies de-
pending on one’s party and the type of tax	in question.
Lower income Republicans are less supportive of income
tax increases on the lower andmiddle classes than lower
income Democrats and are much more sensitive to in-
come tax increases than sales tax increases. This sug-
gests that one reason that taxes have not increased in
response to growing income inequality in the U.S. and
other countries is that many individuals choose not to
support tax increases due to their partisanship and con-
cerns that their own taxes may be increased, rather than
any general antipathy to high taxes per se.
1.1. The Roots of Public Support for Raising Taxes
Political economy models predict that individuals eval-
uate tax increases on the basis of their economic self-
interest, i.e., how the tax hikewill negatively impact their
income and positively impact the benefits they receive
from government. There are a number of reasons why
this relationship is not always observed in empirical re-
search (Sears & Citrin, 1982). But one of the key reasons
that self-interest is not always associated with individ-
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ual tax policy preferences is that broader values and atti-
tudes shape views toward tax policies. Among the most
important factors in the U.S. is partisanship, which can
weaken the link between economic self-interest and pol-
icy preferences.
1.1.1. Economic Self-Interest
The canonical Meltzer and Richard (1981) model of redis-
tributive policy preferences has both macro and micro-
level implications. At the macro-level income inequal-
ity should spur growing redistribution. The micro-level
mechanism is that preferences for redistribution reflect
individual choices, with individuals lower in the income
distribution more likely to support tax increases on the
wealthy because it is in their economic self-interest. If a
tax increase targets the wealthy, the poor or middle class
will not pay the tax, but they can benefit from the govern-
ment programs that are funded with that tax increase.
While the logic of the Meltzer-Richard model (1981)
is intuitive, there are a number of reasons why individu-
als may not support tax increases on the wealthy, even
if they are relatively poor. First, if they believe that indi-
viduals achieve their wealth through hard work, they are
less likely to support tax increases on the wealthy, com-
pared to if they believe it was by luck or birth (Alesina
& Angeletos, 2005; Henninghausen&Heinemann, 2015).
Second, they might not support higher taxes on the
wealthy if they believe that theywill someday bewealthy
or financially better off (Alesina, Stantcheva, & Teso,
2018; Benabou&Ok, 2001; Piketty, 1995). Theymay also
be against redistribution if they do not trust that the
government will do the right thing with the tax revenue
raised (McCall & Kenworthy, 2009; Tuxhorn et al., 2019).
It may also be that individual economic policy prefer-
ences primarily reflect broader sociotropic (economic or
cultural) concerns, and not economic self-interest (Sides
& Citrin, 2007).
Nevertheless, a substantial amount of research in the
U.S., which is the focus of the empirical analysis here, indi-
cates that lower income individuals do indeed havemore
left-leaning views on broad redistributive taxation and
spending issues than affluent and very wealthy individu-
als (Bartels, 2005; Kelly& Enns, 2010; Kelly&Witko, 2012;
Page, Bartels, & Seawright, 2013). One reason that ob-
served tax rates have not responded to growing inequal-
ity in the U.S. may be that individuals with influence in
the policy process have different views about taxes than
the mass public. For instance, research finds that across
a range of issues lawmakers and their staff perceive con-
stituency opinion to bemore conservative than it actually
is and legislators are more responsive to the wealthy and
well-organized interests than average taxpayers (Bartels,
2008; Broockman & Skovron, 2018; Enns, Kelly, Morgan,
Volscho, & Witko, 2014; Gilens, 2012; Hertel-Fernandez,
Mildenberger, & Stokes, 2019; Witko, 2017).
However, in the context of specific tax policy debates
we often fail to observe individuals preferring tax poli-
cies that are consistent with their own economic self-
interest. For instance, in an analysis of support for the
2001 Bush tax cuts, Bartels (2005, 2008) found that in-
come was not a very important predictor of tax policy
preferences, even though these tax cuts would dispro-
portionately benefit the wealthy.
Research shows that the initiative can lead to the
closer alignment of public preferences and public pol-
icy (Franko & Witko, 2017; Gerber, 1999; Kogan, 2016;
Matsusaka, 2004), which can lead to higher taxes on the
wealthy. For example, research on German local govern-
ments shows that where individuals can directly vote on
taxes, taxes are higher and they also have a much nar-
rower base (Asatryan, Baskaran, & Heinemann, 2017),
suggesting that individuals like taxes, as long as oth-
ers are paying them. Research finds that lower income
individuals were more likely to support a ballot initia-
tive that would have increased taxes on the wealthy in
Washington state in the U.S (Franko et al., 2013). How-
ever, it is notable that, despite the fact that the vast ma-
jority of voters would not have paid any taxes, enough
people opposed the initiative that is was not passed.
What can explain why even relatively less affluent indi-
viduals that express abstract support for increasing taxes
on the wealthy in surveys would not vote to do so when
given the opportunity? Unlike surveys, once tax propos-
als leave the realm of abstract survey questions or exper-
imental manipulations and enter into actual political de-
bates competing partisan elites attempt to foment hos-
tility or support for tax increases.
1.1.2. Partisanship
Partisanship is a key factor driving support for a vari-
ety of policies (Abramowitz, 2018; Green, Palmquist, &
Schickler, 2004; Lenz, 2009). Though ballot proposals are
generally nonpartisan, party elites take positions on pro-
posals and thus partisanship is important in voter de-
cision making on ballot measures (Bowler & Donovan,
1998; Lupia, 1994). If individuals choose political par-
ties as a result of their economic position, then parti-
sanship would strengthen the relationship between eco-
nomic self-interest and voting on tax policy initiatives.
While low-income individuals are more likely to identify
as Democrats (Kelly & Witko, 2012), many affluent indi-
viduals support the Democratic Party, and many poorer
individuals support the Republican Party.
According to recent important research by Mason
(2018) partisanship in the contemporary U.S. is not
based mostly on rational calculations about which party
best advances one’s interests, but is more akin to rooting
for a sports team. A great deal of research shows that
voters are influenced by the positions of elites within
their parties, rather than or in addition to joining par-
ties on the basis of their preexisting policy preferences
(Broockman & Butler, 2017; Lenz, 2009). Even control-
ling for past issue preferences, party affiliation shapes
the subsequent issue positions of partisan voters (Lenz,
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2009). Because anti-tax rhetoric and ideological position-
taking is so central to themodern Republican Party’s eco-
nomic policy agenda (Grossman & Hopkins, 2016), Re-
publican identifiers are heavily predisposed to oppose
taxation, particularly when such proposals are framed by
elite rhetoric.
In one of the highest profile tax policy changes in the
U.S. in recent decades, Lupia, Levine, Menning and Sin
(2007) argue that partisanship explains support or oppo-
sition to the 2001 Bush tax cuts better than self-interest,
information or other factors. These same patterns are ev-
ident in voting on statewide ballot measures. In addition
to finding that low-income voters were more supportive,
Franko et al. (2013) find that party had the largest ef-
fect on support for a 2010 ballot initiative in Washington
state that would have significantly raised taxes on the
wealthy. State ballot contests are officially non-partisan,
but partisanship is nevertheless a critical factor in vot-
ing on initiatives over time (Bowler & Donovan, 1998;
Branton, 2003; Smith & Tolbert, 2001). Indeed, because
voters are responsive to cues frompartisan elites (Bowler
& Donovan, 1998, 2004) and organized interests that are
typically associated with one of the parties, individual
partisanship is themost important predictor of voting be-
havior in initiative elections in the American states over
time (Branton, 2003).
But most individuals do not have a consistent lib-
eral or conservative set of policy preferences (Campbell,
Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960). Research by Claassen,
Tucker and Smith (2013) implies that even some self-
proclaimed ideologues may not be able to correctly sort
into the liberal or conservative party because they do not
even know what liberal and conservative mean. Ellis and
Stimson (2012) show that many voters who identify as
conservatives (and thus are mostly Republicans) actually
hold liberal economic and fiscal policy preferences. Thus,
when individuals describe themselves as liberal or conser-
vative many are not referring to support for government
spending or types of taxation regimes but a social iden-
tity based on demographic factors, region or religion (see
Mason, 2018). Ellis and Stimson (2012) refer to voters
that identify as conservatives but have liberal attitudes
toward economic and fiscal policy as conservative “pop-
ulists,” and we adopt this narrow definition of the term
here. This means that even though Republicans are pre-
disposed to oppose tax increases due to their partisan-
ship, this opposition is not completely fixed. Under some
circumstance, self-interest may trump partisanship.
Similarly, wealthy Democrats may sometimes prefer
to not raise taxes, particularly if they are the intended tar-
gets of tax increases. However, because the number of
very wealthy voters is small, these individuals do not gen-
erally have the ability to determine outcomes for ballot
propositions, and they appear in very small numbers in
conventional surveys. Thus, we focus more on how low-
income Republicans may shift their opposition to taxes
depending on the structure of tax increases. We argue
that economic self-interest causes heterogeneity within
the parties in terms of attitudes toward tax increases.
2. Policy Design: The Structure of Tax Increases
One reason that arguments against taxes can be effec-
tive even among individuals who might otherwise sup-
port them is that tax policy tends to be relatively com-
plicated (compared to say, abortion or gay marriage). In-
deed, some research shows that misunderstandings of
tax policy can contribute to support for regressive tax in-
creases, even among the poor (Slemrod, 2006). In many
tax policy debates it is difficult to tell ahead of time just
who the winners and losers are.
Tax increases may vary along a number of dimen-
sions including who pays the tax (e.g., the wealthy, all
income earners), the type of tax (e.g., sales v. income),
the amount of the tax increase (and revenue raised),
and whether the tax increase is permanent or tempo-
rary. While for many low-income taxpayers the payroll
and sales tax actually are more of a financial burden,
the income tax is without question politically the most
salient tax for American taxpayers; taxpayers must go
through the process of completing an annual tax return
form which clearly indicates the amount owed in taxes.
In the states, the sales tax is generally the largest or sec-
ond largest (after the income tax) source of revenue for
state governments. But there may be less opposition to
sales taxes because they are viewed as a small percent-
age of purchases and the costs are hidden when individ-
uals make purchases.
Finally, who pays the tax may influence the support
for the tax increase. In a democracy where majorities to
some extent rule, tax increases targeted at small num-
bers of individuals may have more support among citi-
zens. In contrast, more broad-based tax increases should
have less support among the public, especially among in-
dividuals that are already predisposed to be against taxes.
Because the wealthy are both a small minority and have
substantial resources to put into public coffers, they are
likely to be an attractive target for tax increases, poten-
tially even for those that do not generally like the idea of
increasing taxes. For instance, Asatryan et al. (2017) find
that where Germans had the ability to vote directly on
local taxes they were higher and more focused on busi-
nesses. This suggests, intuitively enough, that individuals
like to tax others.
3. Empirical Expectations
Based on the foregoing discussion we expect Democrats
will, of course, be more likely to favor tax increases than
Republicans, and that partisanship will be a larger fac-
tor in determining voting on tax policy preferences. How-
ever, where the incidence of salient (income) taxes very
clearly falls on others, individuals thatmight generally op-
pose taxation, Republicans, will bemore likely to support
the tax increase. In our empirical analysis we leverage
competing tax proposals to examine this possibility.
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Table 1. Voter support for redistributive ballot measures by party.
Support Support for
N Proposition 30 Proposition 38 Support Neither Support Both
Democrat 271 0.793 0.645 0.158 0.597
Independent 368 0.570 0.440 0.375 0.385
Republican 317 0.293 0.274 0.605 0.173
Low Income 240 0.658 0.571 0.241 0.500
Median Income 531 0.480 0.392 0.441 0.313
High Income 201 0.557 0.428 0.398 0.383
Taxes Burden Not Too High 657 0.642 0.519 0.292 0.454
Taxes Burden Too High 315 0.327 0.286 0.594 0.206
4. Proposition 30
California state public employee unions and the Califor-
nia Democratic Party gathered signatures to place an
initiative before voters which would prevent proposed
large reductions in spending on government programs.
The main provisions of Proposition 30 were to increase
marginal tax rates for seven years by 1% for income be-
tween 250–300K, 2% for income between 300–500K and
3% for income over 500K (twice these amounts for cou-
ples). It also increased the state sales tax by a ¼ cent for
four years and used the revenue to fund public safety,
K-12 education (primary and secondary education) and
community colleges (i.e., two-year colleges). Proponents
argued that Proposition 30 would provide funding for
California’s public education, help balance the state’s
budget, and prevent cuts to public safety programs (KCET,
2012). The initiative proposed a tax increase of approxi-
mately 30% on earnings above $1 million, a substantial
increase by any measure. Though there was also a (re-
gressive) sales tax increase as part of the bill, the more
salient aspect of Proposition 30was the potential income
tax increase because the sales tax increasewas very small
and was to last a shorter period of time.
Proposition 30 was opposed by the Small Business
Action Committee and the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers
Association, the same organization that sponsored
Proposition 13 three decades earlier (Sears & Citrin,
1982). Big business groups (like the California Chamber of
Commerce) that often oppose tax increases stayed neu-
tral and some large firms actually endorsed the measure,
including Bank of America, AT&T, and Kaiser Permanente,
citing the need to invest in the state’s schools to produce
an educated workforce (Buchanan, 2012).
5. Proposition 38
A rival ballotmeasure, Proposition 38,was intended to in-
crease personal income tax rates on annual earnings over
$7,316 using a sliding scale from .4% for lowest individual
earners to 2.2% for individuals earning over $2.5 million,
for twelve years. The funds were targeted for early child-
hood programs and K-12 (primary and secondary) educa-
tion. These competing initiatives are similar in that they
both raise taxes and they provide additional revenue for
public programs, especially education. However, Propo-
sition 38 would have raised income taxes on the lower
and middle classes, and by a substantial amount. Fami-
lies with incomes of $60,000 would have seen their top
marginal tax rate increase from 6.0 to 7.1% with Propo-
sition 38, but the income tax would not increase at all
under Proposition 30 (Legislative Analysts Office, 2012).
The two ballot initiatives would have both increased
funding of government programs from the baseline but
with different income tax structures or policy design.
Of course, these treatments are not perfect because
there are some differences between the two initiatives.
The time horizon of the income tax increase was longer
for Proposition 38 (12 years) compared to Proposition 30
(7 years). Proposition 30 would increase the sales tax
by a ¼ cent for four years while Proposition 38 did
not change the sale tax. Democratic Governor Jerry
Brown was a strong and vocal proponent of Proposi-
tion 30, which should have offered an important par-
tisan cue to voters; gubernatorial endorsements have
influenced other salient initiative contests (Nicholson,
2005; Tolbert & Hero, 1996). Proposition 38 and its cam-
paign were funded by Pasadena civil rights attorney
Molly Munger, daughter of Berkshire Hathaway execu-
tive Charles Munger. Munger’s proposal for how to fund
public schools competed with Governor Jerry Brown’s fa-
vored policy. The public was familiar with the arguments
for and against Proposition 30 and Proposition 38 with
well-funded add campaigns (Burnett, 2013). Proposition
30’s supporters raised over $72 million dollars to the
cause, while opponents spent over $76 million, which
when combined adds up to almost $4 per voter; this is
more than what was spent per voter in recent presiden-
tial elections in the state (followthemoney.org). Proposi-
tion 30passedwith 55.4%of the vote, andProposition 38
was defeated, receiving 28.7% yes votes.
Because both measures were on the ballot at the
same time, individuals were in the unique position of di-
rectly comparing competing tax policy proposals. Thus,
the differences in the proposals were very clear and very
salient compared to other tax policy debates.
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6. Analysis
6.1. Survey Data and Coding
The analysis employs data from the 2012 California Field
Poll, which is a random sample computer-assisted tele-
phone survey carried out by the Field Research Corpora-
tion. In regard to Proposition 30, the survey presented
respondents with the following information:
Proposition 30 is the Temporary Taxes to Fund
Education, Guaranteed Local Public Safety Funding ini-
tiative. It increases taxes on earnings over $250,000
dollars for seven years and sales taxes by a ¼ cent
for four years, to fund schools and guarantees public
safety realignment funding. Fiscal impact: Increased
state tax revenues through 2018–2019, averaging
about 6 billion dollars annually over the next few
years. Revenues available for funding state budget. In
2012–2013, planned spending reductions, primarily
to education programs, would not occur. (D-Lab, n.d.)
Respondents were then asked whether they would sup-
port or oppose Proposition 30. In the following analyses,
this question serves as the dependent variable, where
1 indicates support for Proposition 30, and 0 indicates
opposition or lack of an opinion. By preceding the ques-
tion with an informational paragraph, we are able to de-
termine support for Proposition 30 as if everyone had
been paying enough attention to the policy debate to un-
derstand the content of the proposed initiatives. Given
the campaign spending and press coverage, there was
presumably a high degree of familiarity with Proposition
30’s basic provisions in the broader population. Similar
coding and question wording was used to measure sup-
port for the counter initiative, Proposition 38 (see the
2012 California Field Poll). Because the outcome vari-
ables are binary, logistic regression is used in the statisti-
cal analysis.
The survey included separate questions for party
registration and ideology, but since most theorizing is
about the effects of party, we consider this in the
analysis. The sample used in the analysis included par-
tisans and independents. Party was coded on an ordinal
3-point scale where Democrat = 1, independent = 2 and
Republican = 3. We use this ordinal measure and also
estimate models using separate dichotomous variables
for whether the respondent is a Democrat (coded 1) or
Republican (coded 1), with independents (coded 0) as
the reference group to ensure the results don’t change
based on the measurement of party.
To test the unenlightened self-interest hypothesis,
we use a variable capturing respondents’ perceptions of
their local and state tax burden, where 1 indicated that
the respondent believed they were paying “more than
you should,” and 0 indicted respondents who believed
they are paying “just the right amount” or “less than
you should.”
We include a variable measuring respondents’ in-
come to test the economic self-interest hypothesis. It is
unclear exactly how many of the survey’s respondents
would directly feel the impact of Proposition 30 because
the field poll asked respondents to indicate which of six
income categories they identified with, the highest of
which was over $100,000. Thus, we cannot know with
certainty whether anyone in the sample earned above
$250,000 per year and is therefore subject to the tax.
Higher income earners may have a more realistic pos-
sibility of paying the tax at some point in the future,
so we test income through the use of a continuous or-
dinal income variable (for the six categories) and bi-
nary variables.
We alternatively measure income with binary vari-
ables for low (coded 1, all other 0) and high income re-
spondents (coded 1, all others 0). For the models using
the binary predictors a variable was created to indicate
respondents who do not own a home and who earn un-
der $60,000, which is the category containing the me-
dian family income in California since those at or below
themedian should prefer higher taxes on the wealthy ac-
cording to economic theory (Meltzer & Richard, 1981).
We only include low-income non-homeowners in order
to remove retirees who have some material wealth in
the form of a home from being considered low-income
since a home in California tends to represent a consid-
erable source of wealth. A binary variable was also cre-
ated to indicate “high income” respondents who earned
$100,000 or more annually, with respondents who indi-
cated earning between $60,000 and $100,000 annually
as the reference category. Interaction terms are used to
measure the conditional effects of economic self-interest
and partisanship.
A series of statistical controls include—age (mea-
sured in years), gender (male), education, marital status
(married = 1), homeownership (equal to 1 if respondent
is a homeowner; 0 otherwise) and a series of dummies to
control for race/ethnicity (Hispanic, black or Asian, with
white as the reference category). Because the debate
hinged onwhether peoplewanted to spendmoremoney
on government services we also include two dummy vari-
ables that measure whether respondents thought that
government services have gotten better in recent years,
or worse in recent years (with no change as the baseline
or reference category).
Because the dependent variable is binary we esti-
mate logistic regressions with robust standard errors
clustered by county, since respondents in different areas
may have been exposed to different levels of media and
campaign effects. We begin by estimating the additive
models and then estimate interaction models.
7. Results
Since Proposition 30 was enacted while Proposition 38
failedwe can conclude that taxpayers are not particularly
concerned about relatively modest sales tax increases,
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but are more sensitive to income tax increases. Whereas
Proposition 38 would have raised income taxes on nearly
everyone, Proposition 30 only targeted the wealthy. But
Proposition 30 also had a shorter time horizon, seven
years instead of 12, which may have affected overall sup-
port. Taken together, this would suggest that short-term
sales tax increases are an effective way for governments
to raise revenue without too much public opposition.
Table 1 provides frequencies of support for both ini-
tiatives broken down by party, perceptions of tax bur-
dens and personal income.While patterns of support for
Proposition 30 and 38 are similar across our three ex-
planatory variables, it is interesting that for Democrats
and independents there was a big drop off in support
for Proposition 38 compared to Proposition 30, but less
so for Republicans. Democratic Governor Jerry Brown’s
strong endorsement of Proposition 30 likely provided a
salient cue to voters. While support for Proposition 30
was higher across the board than for Proposition 38, it
is interesting that high income voters were 13% more
likely to favor tax increases on the wealthy than across
the board tax increases, while the gap was 9% for low
and middle income respondents.
Table 2 presents the results of the multivariate logis-
tic regression predicting support for Proposition 30, vary-
ing the respondent’s partisanship (ordinal measure vs a
series of dummy variables) and household income (mea-
sured as an ordinal variable and with binary variables
for low-income and high income with middle income as
the reference category). Regardless of how the variables
were measured, we find that Republicans were signifi-
cantly more likely to oppose raising taxes on the wealthy.
Similarly, individuals who felt their state and local text
burdens were too high are significantly more likely to op-
pose the measure, providing evidence for the unenlight-
ened self-interest hypothesis.
When personal income is measured by the ordinal
variable (columns 1 and 3) the coefficient is not signifi-
cant, but the binary variable for lower income is positive
and statistically significant, indicating that lower income
citizens are significantly more likely to favor raising taxes
on the wealthy compared to those with middle income
or the wealthy. These results are reported in columns 2
and 4. We find some support for that partisanship, self-
interest and unenlightened self-interest (opinions about
one’s own tax burden) mattered.
To understand the substantive effect of these rela-
tionships we generate predicted probabilities from the
coefficients in Table 2. We measure the change in sup-
port for the ballot measure when moving from being a
Republican to a Democrat, from being high income to
low-income, and from thinking your taxes are too high
to thinking your taxes are not too high, while holding
all other variables constant at their mean. Figure 1 re-
ports the change in probabilities (first differences) for
these three statistically significant variables based on the
model in column 2 of Table 2. Moving from stating one’s
tax burden is “too high” to “not too high or just right,”
changes the probability of favoring the ballot measure by
.28 probability, all else equal. This large substantive effect
is the effect of “unenlightened self-interest,” consistent
with previous research re the Bush 2001 taxes (Bartels,
2008). Moving from a high income respondent to a low-
income respondent increases the probability of raising
taxes on the wealthy by .075. This is the direct effect of
economic self-interest. But partisanship is more impor-
tant than self-interest in terms of a direct substantive ef-
fect. Moving from a Republican to a Democrat, results in
a .44 change in the probability of supporting taxes on the
rich, controlling for other factors. Thus, partisanship and
unenlightened self-interest appear to have the largest di-
rect substantive effects, with party the most important.
Low Income
Change in Probability for Supporng Proposion 30
Tax Burden
Not Too High
Democrat
Party ID
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Figure 1. Change (first difference) in the probability of supporting tax increases on the wealthy (from Table 2 column 2).
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7.1. Economic Self-Interest and Party
Table 3 replicates themodel in column 2 of Table 2 but in-
cludes interaction terms for partisanshipwith tax burden
attitudes, and an interaction of partisanshipwith income.
While the interaction term for high incomemultiplied by
partisanship is not statistically significant (column 1), the
interaction term for low-income respondents with par-
tisanship (column 2) is positive and statistically signifi-
cant. This suggests economic self-interest is moderating
the effect of party. The interaction effect for attitudes
about tax burdens and partisanship is negatively signed
in column 3 but not statistically significant. However, the
base term for party is statistically significant. Jaccard and
Turrisi (2003) argue that if either of the base terms in an
interaction equation are statistically significant, the inter-
actionmodel is statistically significant, even if the interac-
tion term itself is not. We thus graph the predicted prob-
abilities for this interaction model as well.
Predicted probabilities are presented in Figures 2 (co-
efficients from Table 3 column 3) and Figure 3 (Table 3
column 2). Figure 2 shows that if the respondent thinks
they pay the right amount in state and local taxes a ma-
jority of Democrats and independents favor raising taxes
on the wealthy (holding other factors constant), but sup-
port drops among Republicans, even for thosewho don’t
think they pay too much in taxes. Among respondents
who believe their tax burdens are too high, a majority
of both independents and Republicans opposed the bal-
lot measure. For Republicans, who are predisposed to be
Probability of Supporng Proposion 30 Based on Taxaon and Party
Democrat
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Figure 2. Conditional effect of tax burden and party identification on the probability of favoring tax increases for (a) on the
wealthy (b) for everyone.
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receptive to anti-tax messages, the gap between those
who think their tax burden was too high and those that
think their tax burden is not too high is very large, esti-
mated to be a difference of about 30 percentage points.
Thus, partisan affiliation amplified views about tax bur-
dens for Republicans, reducing support, while making it
a less important consideration for Democrats.
Figure 3 reports the results of the interaction be-
tween partisanship and low-income (incomes at or be-
low the median in the state). For Republicans, increasing
income resulted in a decreased probability of support-
ing the tax increase on the rich, while a majority of low-
income Republicans favored it. For Democrats, the ef-
fect was the opposite—higher income voters were actu-
ally more supportive of Proposition 30, though the differ-
ences were fairly modest and not statistically significant.
Here, enough lower income Republicans and indepen-
dents supported the proposal to enact it with the over-
whelming support of Democrats. Lower income “pop-
ulist” Republicans defected from their party’s position in
supporting higher taxes on the wealthy.
7.2. Counter Initiative: Proposition 38
Tables 1–3 replicate the models above, comparing sup-
port for Proposition 30 to Proposition 38. The same
pattern of low-income Republicans favoring the tax in-
crease is evident but to a much lower degree (see
Figures 3B). While low-income people are more likely to
favor both tax increases, the size of the coefficient for
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Figure 3. Conditional effect of tax burden and partisanship on the probability of favoring tax increases for (a) on thewealthy
(b) for everyone.
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Table 2. Predicting Voter Support for Proposition 30
Dependent variable:
Yes on Proposition 30
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Partisanship (Republican) −0.970*** −0.973***
(0.081) (0.082)
Republican −0.872*** −0.870***
(0.200) (0.195)
Democrat 1.087*** 1.095***
(0.200) (0.197)
Perceive Tax Burden Too High −1.179*** −1.186*** −1.184*** −1.191***
(0.140) (0.143) (0.136) (0.139)
Income 0.015 0.013
(0.050) (0.053)
Income Missing −0.112 0.034 −0.125 0.027
(0.374) (0.298) (0.383) (0.300)
Home owner −0.401** −0.401**
(0.130) (0.131)
High income (above 100K) 0.197 0.197
(0.184) (0.184)
Low income (below 60K) 0.506** 0.510**
(0.155) (0.157)
Services Worse −0.228 −0.230 −0.232 −0.235
(0.139) (0.137) (0.139) (0.136)
Services Better 0.162 −0.159 −0.165 −0.162
(0.089) (0.091) (0.090) (0.092)
Age −0.008* −0.009** −0.008* −0.009**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Education 0.099 0.105 0.098 0.104
(0.067) (0.065) (0.067) (0.064)
Hispanic 0.517 0.501 0.518 0.504
(0.296) (0.285) (0.292) (0.280)
African American 0.612** 0.597* 0.617** 0.602*
(0.237) (0.239) (0.237) (0.239)
Asian 0.325 0.297 0.334 0.308
(0.188) (0.182) (0.189) (0.185)
Married 0.075 0.069 0.082 0.075
(0.152) (0.156) (0.150) (0.153)
Male −0.108 −0.108 −0.113 −0.113
(0.110) (0.111) (0.113) (0.114)
Constant 2.842*** 2.517*** 0.862** 0.521
(0.343) (0.392) (0.313) (0.380)
Observations 893 893 893 893
Log Likelihood −540.002 −540.019 −540.002 −540.019
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,112.004 1,114.037 1,112.004 1,114.037
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Proposition 38 is roughly half that of Proposition 30 (see
Table 1). While the coefficient for the interaction term
(Republican X low-income respondent) is significant for
Proposition 38, the size of the interaction coefficient is
roughly half the size (.38) compared to the Proposition 30
(.60) (see Table 3). Substantively, as shown in Figure 3B,
a majority of low-income Republicans never approved of
increasing taxes across the board (Proposition 38). For
Proposition 30, the models estimate 55% of low-income
Republicans favored the initiative. And for Proposition 38
regardless of economic condition (low-income or evalua-
tion of tax burden) a majority of Republicans never ap-
proved of the measure, unlike Proposition 30.
Figure 3B also seems to suggest that low-income
Republicans look a lot more like low-income Democrats
in their probability of supporting Proposition 38, than
they look like high income Republicans.	The model sug-
gests the failure to generate higher support across all
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Table 3. Predicting Voter Support for Proposition 30, Conditional Models
Dependent variable:
Yes on Proposition 30
(1) (2) (3)
Partisanship (Republican) −0.898*** −1.118*** −0.818***
(0.117) (0.124) (0.124)
Perceive Tax Burden Too High −1.164*** −1.173*** −0.004
(0.173) (0.173) (0.552)
Income missing 0.028 0.038 0.073
(0.283) (0.291) (0.288)
High income (above 100K) 1.008 0.190 0.241
(0.616) (0.215) (0.213)
Low income (below 60K) 0.507* −0.737 0.507*
(0.210) (0.534) (0.212)
Services Better −0.160 −0.158 −0.148
(0.093) (0.093) (0.092)
Services Worse −0.221 −0.205 −0.242
(0.178) (0.178) (0.178)
Age −0.009* −0.009* −0.009*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Education 0.101 0.094 0.104
(0.076) (0.077) (0.076)
Hispanic 0.499* 0.483* 0.495*
(0.238) (0.239) (0.240)
African American 0.610 0.600 0.584
(0.364) (0.364) (0.373)
Asian 0.313 0.310 0.282
(0.196) (0.196) (0.196)
Married 0.064 0.082 0.077
(0.173) (0.175) (0.174)
Male −0.106 −0.111 −0.106
(0.156) (0.157) (0.157)
Partisanship X High income −0.386
(0.273)
Partisanship X Low income 0.607*
(0.242)
Partisanship X Perceive
Tax Burden Too High −0.545
(0.242)
Constant 2.359*** 2.848*** 2.203***
(0.489) (0.503) (0.495)
Observations 893 893 893
Log Likelihood −537.237 −538.432 −539.986
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,110.473 1,112.863 1,115.972
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
groups is important.	This illustrates one of our main
points that how the tax policies are designed matters.
For a subset of lower income Republicans, self-
interest trumped partisanship favoring Proposition 30,
but not Proposition 38. The same is true for low-income
independents. The results show that economic self-
interest (i.e., income) conditions the effects of party in
terms of raising taxes on the wealthy, but less so raising
taxes on everyone. A key difference is that taxing the rich
attracted support from low-income Republicans (and in-
dependents), and even independents who felt they paid
too much in taxes, which did not occur for tax increases
in general.
While it is common for observers to accuse lower-
income Republicans of acting against their own eco-
nomic self-interest (e.g., Frank, 2005), from the same
economic perspective, rich Democrats are also irrational,
a charge that is leveled less frequently. In any case, when
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thinking about voting on an initiative, the views of the
very wealthy are not that important for outcomes simply
because there are so fewwealthy, compared to poor and
middle class, people.
8. Conclusions
The unique situation with competing tax increase pro-
posals on the ballot in California in 2012 allowed us to
directly examine how the structure of tax policies af-
fects support for tax increases among different groups
of voters, and consider the conditions under which par-
tisanship and self-interest shape tax policy attitudes. Be-
cause we observe attitudes toward competing tax pro-
posals from the same voters in the same election cam-
paign we account for many individual and contextual
factors that are hard to account for when comparing
support for different tax proposals at different times or
across different polities using observational data. The
fact that the tax increases were structured very dif-
ferently allowed us to determine how general opposi-
tion to tax increases rooted in partisanship and ideol-
ogy may weaken and allow for individual self-interest to
shape policy attitudes.We find that partisanship and self-
interest influence support for tax increases, but that the
effect of party varies depending on one’s income and
the type of tax increase in question. Specifically, low-
income Republicans aremore supportive of tax increases
in general than high income Republicans, especially in-
come tax increases on the wealthy, but less supportive
of income tax increases on the lower and middle classes
than Democrats with similar incomes. This indicates that
self-interest can trump partisanship for this group of vot-
ers when the incidence of tax payment is clearly on other
individuals, in this case the wealthy.
As Piketty and others propose high taxes on the
wealthy to address growing inequality, and several mem-
bers of the U.S. Congress and Democratic Presidential
candidates have floated similar ideas, understanding
how the structure of tax increases shapes support for dif-
ferent tax policy proposals is a salient question for policy-
makers. Just as California’s passage of Proposition 13 in
1978 (which capped property taxes and made it harder
to increase taxes) provided an example for other states
wishing to reverse high taxes and rapidly growing govern-
ment spending (Berkman, 1994), Proposition 30may pro-
vide an example for other states wishing to increase gov-
ernment revenue and address income inequality.
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